Due to its flexible and pervasive sensing ability, crowdsensing has been extensively studied recently in research communities. However, the fundamental issue of how to meet the requirement of sensing robustness in crowdsensing remains largely unsolved. Specifically, from the task owner's perspective, how to minimize the total payment in crowdsensing while guaranteeing the sensing data quality is a critical issue to be resolved. We elegantly model the robustness requirement over sensing data quality as chance constraints, and investigate both hard and soft chance constraints for different crowdsensing applications. For the former, we reformulate the problem through Boole's Inequality, and explore the optimal value gap between the original problem and the reformulated problem. For the latter, we study a serial of a general payment minimization problem, and propose a binary search algorithm that achieves both feasibility and low payment. The performance gap between our solution and the optimal solution is also theoretically analyzed. Extensive simulations validate our theoretical analysis.
Introduction
In recent years, the provision of real-time environmental information (e.g., traffic condition, noise level and air quality, etc) to citizens is increasingly demanded in daily life. Due to the proliferation of hand-held mobile devices equipped with various sensors, crowdsensing (Ganti et al. 2011 ) becomes an effective way to collect sensing information with a low deployment cost. In crowdsensing, instead of deploying many fixed sensors in the target area, human crowds with mobile devices (say participants) act as mobile sensors to gather the information of the surrounding area, and utilize the cellular network to upload data for crowdsensing applications. Due to its high efficiency and ubiquity (Han et al. 2015) , crowdsensing has spurred a wide interest from both academic and industry for designing many interesting crowdsensing applications (Khan et al. 2013 ).
To fully exploit the benefits of crowdsensing, we need to address several challenges.
First, a certain level of sensing robustness should be guaranteed. In practice, it is hardly to accurately estimate how many people will participate in the crowdsensing task, because their decisions are affected by various factors. Since most of involved participants are unprofessional, the sensing data from a single participant would be untrusted or with low quality (Wang et al. 2012 , Min et al. 2013 . Therefore, a minimum number of participants is required to guarantee the sensing robustness, which is imposed by many crowdsensing applications (Duan et al. 2012 , He et al. 2014 . Moreover, since a crowdsensing task usually involves the collection of sensing data at different times and different locations, e.g., updating the PM2.5 information every hour in the daytime in various areas of a city, the robustness requirement can be both time-specific and location-specific. Then, how to satisfy the time-specific and location-specific requirement is urgent for sensing robustness in crowdsensing.
Second, since participating in crowdsensing consumes physical resources and requires manual efforts, the participants with rationality will expect financial or social rewards from the owner who disseminates the crowdsensing task. Due to limited budget, from the perspective of the owner, it should minimize the total payment while satisfying the minimum participants requirement as much as possible. There is a tradeoff between the minimization of total payment and satisfaction of minimum participants requirement. A higher reward (referred as bid in this paper) usually attracts more participants because of a larger accept-to-participate probability from the potential participants ).
This can lead to a high total payment, although the minimum participants requirement can be satisfied easily. On the contrary, if the owner provides a lower bid, people could have less interest in participating resulting in fewer participants, despite a low total payment.
In this paper, we study the problem of minimizing the total payment over all time slots and locations while guaranteeing the sensing robustness in crowdsensing. Different from existing studies, we model the requirement on the sensing robustness as a chance constraint, which guarantees that the probability of achieving the minimum participants requirement at any time slot and any location is not lower than a predefined level. In addition, for many crowdsensing applications, e.g., environment monitoring, imposing such strong requirement of sensing robustness at each time slot is unnecessary. It is sufficient to guarantee a high probability that there are enough participants at any location during the task duration. For example, people sometimes are interested in average air condition during a day. Above models are flexible and well capture the features of sensing robustness requirement in crowdsensing.
Bearing in mind different levels of sensing robustness requirement, we propose two types of chance constraints, i.e., hard chance constraint and soft chance constraint. In the hard chance constraint case, we require that the joint probability of achieving the minimum participants requirement at all time slots and locations is no less than 1 − ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is close to 0. A typical example is monitoring outages of public works (e.g., broken traffic lights, malfunctioning fire hydrants) by crowdsensing (Ganti et al. 2011 ). In the soft chance constraint case, for any location l, the probability of achieving α l percentage of required participant number during task duration is no less than β, where β > 0 is close to 1. It is suitable for the applications with relatively loose robustness requirement, e.g., pollution monitoring in a city (Dutta et al. 2009 ).
However, solving problems with chance constraints are usually challenging because these constraints are generally difficult to be expressed in a closed form except in very few cases (Nemirovski and Shapiro 2006) . Although some chance-constrained optimization techniques have been applied in existing works (e.g. So and Zhang 2013 , Kim et al. 2013 , Qu et al. 2015 , only feasible solutions without performance guarantee are obtained. In this work, to solve the problem with a hard chance constraint, we reformulate it as a solvable convex problem using Boole's Inequality (Bonferroni 1936) , which is an approximation problem of the original one. Their theoretical performance gap is also derived. For the soft chance constraint case, we first transform it into a general payment minimization problem, and analyze the feasibility of its optimal solution to the original problem. Thus motivated, we propose a binary search algorithm to find a feasible solution of the original problem, whose performance gap is theoretically analyzed.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We study the problem of minimizing the total payment with the sensing robustness requirement in crowdsensing, which is yet seldom studied in many crowdsensing applications. Instead of using the expectations in existing works, we are the first to model the payment minimization crowdsensing problem using chance constraints, which better characterize the demand of crowdsensing and is more flexible in realistic. According to the different levels of the sensing robustness requirement, we propose both hard chance constraint and soft chance constraint to model the payment minimization crowdsensing problem.
• For the hard chance constraint case, via Boole's Inequality, we reformulate the problem into a solvable convex problem, which is actually an approximation of the original problem.
By analyzing the difference in the constraints, we theoretically derive the optimal value gap between the two aforementioned problems, which is largely ignored in previous chanceconstrained optimization approaches. Further, by introducing a relaxation problem of the original one, we enhance the above optimal value gap.
• For the soft chance constraint case, which cannot be directly reformulated via Boole's Inequality, we study a general payment minimization problem with parameters γ. By studying the properties of the optimal solutions of this problem, we find that the feasibility of its optimal solution to the original problem strictly increases with the increase of γ. We then propose a binary search algorithm based on Monte Carlo method, to obtain a feasible solution of the original problem with a high probability, whose performance compared with the optimal solution is also theoretically analyzed.
• We also study a special case of the soft chance constraint in which both the sensing robustness requirement and bidding function are time independent, and derive a closed form of the solution by approximation. The bidding policy from our solution is state independent, which is described by a static bidding price (location-specific) over the time.
Although the general optimal bidding policy in this kind of problem is state dependent, the distinct advantage of our state independent bidding policy is simple to compute, compared with the complex computational optimal policy. The bound of the performance gap between our solution and the optimal solution is also derived.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related works is briefly reviewed in Section 2 and the basic crowdsensing model is introduced in Section 3. We tackle the crowdsensing problem with a hard chance constraint and with multiple soft chance constraints in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In Section 6, we conduct extensive simulations to validate our theoretic analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
In essence, our aim is to design incentive policies for crowdsensing, to ensure the sensing robustness while minimizing the total payment. There are extensive studies about the incentive design for crowdsensing in existing works. Reddy et al. (2010) studies the participatory sensing performance of incentive policies with different micro-payment incentive structures. This work mainly focuses on recording the participation likelihood, and pays little attention in incentives. Additionally, there are several empirical experiments (Mason and Watts 2010 , Musthag et al. 2011 , Yu et al. 2014 ) demonstrating the impact of social and financial incentives on the willingness of participants as well as the uploaded sensing data quality. However, these experiment works fail to design a flexible incentive policy to fulfill the diverse sensing robustness requirement.
Additionly, Lee and Hoh (2010) propose a reverse auction based dynamic bidding policy to encourage participants to upload the sensing data with the claimed bids. Yang et al.
(2012) proposes incentive policies based on both a user-centric and platform-centric model for crowdsourcing to smartphones, which can adjust the participants' behavior for better crowdsensing performance. Kawajiri et al. (2014) develops a wireless indoor localization system based on crowdsensing, and guides participants to cover enough locations for the improvement of quality of service. And Koutsopoulos (2013) studies the problem of minimizing platform's total cost while guaranteeing service quality, and proposes an incentive policy to determine payment allocation and participation level. Moreover, although both Han et al. (2015) and consider the minimum number of participants in the execution of a crowdsensing task, they simply employ the expectation in the constraint or utilize a deterministic constraint that the requirement should be satisfied at any time.
Nonetheless, these studies either have separately addressed the incentive issues and sensing robustness concerns, or have not well characterized the sensing robustness requirement.
In contrast, in this work, we systemically study the incentive policy design with the sensing robustness guarantee in crowdsening, and model the sensing robustness requirement as chance constraints, which are more flexible for designing intelligent incentive policies.
Furthermore, we study two kinds of chance constraints based on the different levels of sensing robustness in various crowdsensing applications, i.e., hard chance constraint and soft chance constraint. And in both cases, We theoretically analyze the performance gap between our solution and the optimal solution, while this kind of theoretical results is seldom presented in previous chance-constrained optimization works (e.g. So and Zhang 2013 , Kim et al. 2013 , Qu et al. 2015 , which usually obtain feasible solutions only. In crowdsensing, the sensing data needs to be collected both at different times and different places.
Model
We consider a task owner whose sensing task lasting for a certain amount of time, which is divided into a number of discrete slots, over a target area. Typically, such tasks can be monitoring outages of public works or air pollution for citizens in a city during each day. This type of task usually involves the collection of sensing data at different times and different places, as shown in Fig. 1 . The sensing robustness requirement of the task may vary in both spatial and temporal dimensions. According to (Han et al. 2015 ), this requirement can be ensured by involving at least a minimum number of participants in the crowdsensing task. To conduct the task, the owner recruits a number of participants for data collection. In each time slot, the task owner interacts with potential participants as follows:
1) the owner firstly releases the task with its bidding, i.e., the rewards for conducting the task, to all potential participants in the target area;
2) given the bidding, the potential participants decide whether to participate or not, and then send the decision to the owner;
3) upon receiving the response, if the number of potential participants accepting the participation is no less than a predefined threshold (e.g., r min ), the owner randomly selects r min participants from these potential participants 1 , and pays the corresponding bid price after receiving the sensing data uploaded by these participants; otherwise, the owner won't do anything until next slot, i.e., he will give up the task during the current time slot. Let T = {1, ..., T } denote the set of time slots. Assume that the target area can be divided into several locations, and the set of locations is denoted by L = {1, ..., L}. Let r l t and x l t be the minimum number of required participants and the actual number of participants chosen by the owner at time t ∈ T at location l ∈ L, respectively. According to the crowdsensing described above, the value of x l t can be as follows:
if the number of potential participants accepting the bid price at time t at location l is no less than r l t , 0 otherwise.
Next, we formally define the strategy profile of the owner and participants respectively as follows:
Definition 1 (Bidding Vector) The bidding vector of the owner at time t ∈ T is defined
, where b l t is the bid for location l and bounded by a maximum value b
Note that for different time slots and different locations, the bids may be different. For example, in the traffic volume monitoring application, the amount of the task varies from rush hours to idle hours, as well as from urban areas to suburbs. Given the differentiated amount of the task, a smart owner should also change its bidding policy adaptively. The current bidding vector in Fig. 1 is (2, 3, 1, 3, 4, 2, 1, 3, 2).
Given a bid, a potential participant randomly decides whether to accept or reject, whose distribution is determined by:
Definition 2 (Accept-to-Participate Function) The accept-to-participate function of a participant at time t ∈ T at location l ∈ L is defined by:
Generally, the greater value of b, the larger probability of accepting to participate.
However, the increasing trend of the accept-to-participate probability will decrease as the growth of b, a.k.a., the marginal effect. In other words, for any
We study this problem from the owner's perspective with the objective of minimizing the total payment over all time slots and locations, while satisfying the sensing robustness requirement as much as possible. Depending on the satisfactory level of the sensing robustness requirement in different crowdsensing applications, we model two types of chance constraints in the optimization problem. i.e., hard chance constraint and soft chance constraint. In the first type of constraint, the joint probability that the sensing robustness requirement at all time slots and locations can be satisfied is no less than 1 − ǫ, while in the second one, for any location l ∈ L, the probability that at least α l percent of the requirement can be satisfied during the task duration is no less than β. We deal with the crowdsensing problems with the two types of chance constraint in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
Crowdsensing with Hard Chance Constraint
In this section, we study the crowdsensing problem with a hard chance constraint on the sensing robustness requirement. Due to the hardness using the chance constraint, this problem will be reformulated using Boole's Inequality, in order to obtain a feasible approximation solution of the original problem. We then derive the performance gap between the optimal solution and the approximation one.
Problem Statement
In essence, the owner's objective is to minimize the total payment, while maintaining the probability of satisfying the sensing robustness requirement at any time slot and any location no less than a predefined value 1 − ǫ, where ǫ is a small value close to 0, e.g., 0.02.
Based on Eq. (2) and the definition of ρ l t , we mathematically formulate the crowdsensing problem with a hard chance constraint in the following:
PA1: Crowdsensing with a Hard Chance Constraint
The above problem is hard to solve, due to the combinatorial difficulty in the multiplication form in constraint (3), where the variable ρ l t is continuous. In the following, we reformulate the problem into a solvable convex problem, by using Boole's Inequality.
Through this reformulation, the new constraint will share a similar additive structure with the objective function, which enables the problem to be efficiently solved.
Reformulation via Boole's Inequality
Firstly, based on the definition of ρ l t , we have Pr{A
Also, we define the indicator function I l t (x l t ) as follows
Eq. (5) 
The following lemma ensures that any feasible solution of PA2 is feasible for PA1.
Lemma 1 Any feasible solution of PA2 is also a feasible solution of PA1.
Proof. Since the objectives of PA1 and PA2 are identical, we only need to prove that (6) is a sufficient condition for (4). In fact, according to the definition of I Pr{A i }, the LHS of (4) can be lower bounded by
Therefore, if (6) holds, (4) also holds based on the fact of (7). The lemma is thus proved.
Performance Gap Analysis
PA2 can be seen as a conservative approximation to PA1, which substitutes the LHS of (4) by the RHS of (7) in (4). Note that Lemma 1 only gives the feasibility guarantee. However, the approximation gap between the optimal values of PA2 and PA1 is still unclear. In the following, in Section 4.3.1, we first analyze the performance gap between the approximation solution and the optimal solution by analyzing the conservatism in the constraints, and provide an initial bound on the performance gap. And we then introduce a relaxed problem of PA1 to enhance the bound on the performance gap in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1. First Bound on the Performance Gap: We begin with the analysis of the difference in the conservatism in the approximation of PA2 to PA1 in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The difference between the LHS and RHS of the inequality in (7) is no more
Proof. LetĀ l t be the complementary event of A l t . Then the difference between the LHS and RHS of the inequality in (7), i.e., △, can be rewritten as
From (4), we know that Pr 
In our problem, since the satisfaction of the sensing robustness requirement is relatively independent at any time slot and location, {Ā l t } t=1,...,T,l=1,...,L is probabilistically independent with each other, then
The lemma thus holds.
Next, we will analyze the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA2 and that of PA1 based on the above conservatism result. To simplify the notations, we let
, where ρ := {ρ l with the convex property, strong duality holds for PA2. Therefore,ρ is a primal optimal solution of PA2 (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004) . The lemma thus holds.
Based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can obtain the initial bound about the optimal value gap between PA1 and PA2 in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let ρ * be an optimal solution of PA1. And letλ andρ be the optimal solutions of (10), then the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be bounded by
Proof. We derive the bound in two steps. According to Lemma 3,ρ is an optimal solution of PA2. We begin with the definitions ofλ andρ, which are the solutions of (10).
We then have
The second equality follows the definition ofλ and the strong duality property. The first inequality is due to the definition ofρ. The second inequality is because ofλ ≥ 0 and
And the last inequality follows Lemma 2. Further, since the objective is a minimization and Lemma 1 holds, we have
Combining (12) and (13), the theorem thus holds.
Second
Bound by Introducing a Relaxation: Theorem 1 shows that the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 is actually of the
In the following, we construct a relaxed problem of PA1 to provide a possible tighter bound. Recall that in Lemma 2, we have obtained Pr{Ā
Pr{Ā l t } ≤ T Lǫ. Therefore, substituting ǫ by T Lǫ in (6), we actually get a relaxed problem of PA1 in the following:
Similar to PA1 and PA2, PA3 can be simplified as min H(ρ)≤T Lǫ F (ρ).
Since PA3 is a relaxed problem of PA1, for any feasible solution ρ of PA1, ρ is also a feasible solution of PA3. Furthermore, utilizing PA3, the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 can also be bounded by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let ρ * be an optimal solution of PA1. And letλ andρ be the optimal solutions of (10). Thus, the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be also bounded by
Proof. Due to Lemma 3,λ is obviously an optimal solution of PA2. Recall that PA3
is a relaxation to PA1, and the objective is identical as min ρ F (ρ). Letρ be an optimal solution of PA3. Combining the result of (13), we have
Note that the constraint in PA3 is equivalent to
Similar to the proof in (12), we have
where the last inequality is because of H(ρ) ≤ T Lǫ.
Due to (17) and (18), we have 0
The proof is thus concluded.
Combining the results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we formally record the bound about the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 below.
Theorem 3 Let ρ * be an optimal solution of PA1. And letλ andρ be the optimal solutions of (10). Then, the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be bounded
ǫ 2 . Theorem 3 shows the bound about the performance gap between the optimal solution of the reformulated problem (PA2) and that of the original problem (PA1). Since both F (ρ) and H(ρ) are differentiable, we can easily obtain the value ofλ by the KKT optimality condition (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004) , i.e., ∇F (ρ) +λ∇H(ρ) = 0. If H(ρ) < 0, we then haveλ = 0; otherwise, we can boundλ byλ ≤
.
Crowdsensing with Soft Chance Constraint
Different from Section 4, we model the constraint of the sensing robustness requirement as multiple soft chance constraints in this section. Specifically, the soft chance constraints ensure that for any location l ∈ L, the robustness requirement is satisfied at least α l (α l ∈ (0, 1]) percentage over T time slots with a probability of β or more, where β is close to 1, e.g., 98%. Compared to the hard chance constraint (3) in PA1 in Section 4, this constraint can not only be more suitable for some kind of tasks with a slightly loose requirement, but also better characterize the location-specific requirement in the task execution.
Problem Statement
To formulate the crowdsensing problem with soft chance constraints, we first define an indicator functionĪ 
Accordingly, we know that E{Ī l t } = ρ l t . In light of Eq. (19), the average times that the sensing robustness requirement is satisfied at location l ∈ L over task duration T is 
Similar to PA1 in Section 4, PB1 is also untractable due to the chance constraint in (20).
Unfortunately, we cannot directly apply a similar approximation approach in Section 4 to PB1, because of the more challenging form of (20).
To obtain a feasible solution of PB1, we study a general payment minimization problem related to PB1, by transforming (20) into a constraint in expectation for the total times of success requirement satisfaction for any location as follows:
which utilizes the fact
In PB1, (20) guarantees that the probability on the success percentage for each location l ∈ L is lower bounded by β, i.e.,
which can imply
As a result, if we set γ l = T α l β in PB2, we can obtain a relaxed problem of PB1 as follows:
Although PB3 can be solved by classical convex approaches, its feasible solution may not be feasible for PB1, since PB3 is only a relaxed version of PB1. Fortunately, in this work, we find that PB1 and PB2 have a very appealing relationship between their solutions.
We begin with some important notations. Let h l (ρ l ) be the LHS of (20) in PB1 for each l ∈ L, i.e.,
where
And denote the optimal solution of PB2 corresponding to γ be ρ * (γ) = {ρ * l (γ l )} l∈L , where γ := {γ l } l∈L . Next, we study how the value of h l (ρ * l (γ l )) will change with the variation of γ l . Our findings will reveal that, if we increase the value of γ l , h l (ρ * l (γ l )) also increases. In other words, h l (ρ * l (γ l )) has a positive correlation with the value of γ l in fact. This motivates us to design an algorithm that can find a value ofγ, so as to obtain a solution ρ * (γ) feasible for PB1 and with low payment.
In the rest of this section, we will analyze the properties of optimal solutions of PB2 in Section 5.2, and theoretically prove the above observations in the end of this subsection.
Based on the results of Section 5.2, we then propose a binary search algorithm based on Monte Carlo method that finds a solution feasible for PB1 with a high probability in Section 5.3. Using a very similar analysis method as in Section 4, we also theoretically derive the performance gap between our solution and the optimal solution. Last, in Section 5.4, we study a special case of PB1 by assuming that both the requirement r l t and bidding function b l t (·) are time independent, and derive a closed form solution by approximation.
Properties of Optimal Solutions of PB2
In this part, we explore several interesting and useful properties of the optimal solutions of PB2. We begin with some necessary notations. For simplicity, we first let f tl (·) be the inside of the summation in the objective function in PB2, i.e., f tl (ρ
. Thus, the objective function can also be represented as
Recall that in Lemma 3, we have verified that f tl (ρ l t ) is strictly increasing and convex in ρ
Furthermore, since b l t (·) is strictly increasing and convex, and f
Since the objective function has a separable structure in location l ∈ L, and the constraints for each location l are actually independent with each other, solving PB2 is equivalent to solving L independent subproblems as follows:
Suppose that ρ * l = {ρ * t l } t=1,...,T is an optimal solution of PB2.l (l = 1, ..., L), then ρ * = {ρ * l } l=1,...,L will be an optimal solution of PB2; and vice versa. Therefore, in the following, we focus on the lth subproblem only, whose properties in the optimality also hold for any other subproblems.
Since ρ l t ∈ [0, 1] for ∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L, if γ l > T , PB2.l will be unsolvable. If γ l = T , the corresponding optimal solution will be meaningless in practical, i.e., ρ * t l = 1, t = 1, ..., T , which corresponds to the policy that always releases the largest bid, although it is surely feasible for PB2. Also, if γ l ≤ 0, ρ * t l = 0, t = 1, ..., T , which is obviously infeasible for PB2.
As a result, the rest of this section is based on the assumption of 0 < γ l < T for l = 1, ..., L unless specified.
For the first derivative of any optimal solution ρ * l = {ρ * t l } t=1,...,T for PB2.l, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let ρ * l := {ρ * t l } t=1,...,T be an optimal solution of PB2.l, and f
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 4 reveals a very interesting property in the property of optimal solutions of PB2.l, i.e., the first derivatives of each f tl (·) (t = 1, ..., T ) at any optimal solution are equal.
This nice property can be used to show how the value of the optimal solution will change with the parameter γ l , as illustrated in the following lemma.
..,T be the optimal solutions corresponding to γ l andγ l in (27) for PB2.l, respectively. Ifγ l > γ l , then for ∀t = 1, ..., T , we have ρ * t
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 5 reveals another important property of the optimal solution of PB2.l: if we increase the value of γ l , the value of the corresponding optimal solution (ρ * l (γ l ) := {ρ * t l (γ l )} t=1,...,T ) also strictly increases, i.e., ρ * t l (γ l ) is strictly increasing in γ l ∈ (0, T ) for any t = 1, ..., T . Based on this property, we are able to demonstrate how h l (ρ * l (γ l )), which is the LHS of (20), will change with the increase of γ l in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Let ρ * l (γ l ) := {ρ * t l (γ l )} t=1,...,T be an optimal solution of PB2.l with γ l . Then, (24) is strictly increasing with the increase of γ l .
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
According to Theorem 4, if we increase the value of γ l , the probability of
is also increasing, since h l (ρ * l (γ l )) increases. This means that the probability that ρ * l (γ l ) := {ρ * l t (γ l )} t=1,...,T satisfies the constraint (27) in PB2.l will be higher with the increase of γ l . Thanks to this observation, we are able to find the smallest γ l that returns a feasible solution of PB1, which is introduced in detail in the following subsection.
A Binary Search Algorithm for PB1
In this subsection, we propose a binary search algorithm for PB1 based on Monte Carlo method, to obtain a feasible bidding policy for the crowdsensing problem with soft chance constraints. The key insight of our algorithm is as follows. When we increase the value of γ l from 0 for each subproblem of PB2, the feasibility of its optimal solution to PB1 improves. Since the objective of PB2 is identical to that of PB1, this optimal solution can be a good approximation solution of PB1 if some feasibility condition holds. Note that in our algorithm, we utilize binary search to find an appropriate γ l between the initial interval [0, T ]. And the feasibility condition is checked by Monte Carlo method. In the following, we introduce the proposed algorithm in detail.
For convenience, we first define (24) . By definition, a sequence ρ := {ρ l } l=1,...,L is feasible for PB1 if g l (ρ l ) is not negative, for any l = 1, ..., L. Let ρ * l (γ l ) be the optimal solution of PB2.l with γ l . For simplicity, we denote g l (ρ * l (γ l )) by q l (γ l ) in the algorithm, for l = 1, ..., L.
As shown in Algorithm 1, we first initialize the search interval [γ l , γ l ] as [0, T], for each l = 1, ..., L. Then, from Line 1, we independently search the appropriate γ l for PB2.l from l = 1 to L. Line 2 provides the terminal condition for each l, i.e., whenever σ ≤ q l (γ l ) ≤ σ holds, it records the optimal solution corresponding to σ, and then calculates the corresponding bidding prices based on the bidding function, as illustrated in Line 11.
Note that the terminal condition means that, we have found an appropriate value γ l , whose corresponding optimal solution of PB2.l (ρ * l (γ l )) is feasible for the lth subproblem of PB1 with a high probability, and the expected payment is not large. The former property is ensured by imposing a lower bound on q l (γ l ), i.e., q l (γ l ) ≥ σ, which is used to reduce the inevitable error introduced by Monte Carlo method. The latter property is guaranteed by upper bounding q l (γ l ) to a value slightly larger than σ, i.e., q l (γ l ) ≤ σ. Initialization: For l = 1, ..., L, set γ l = 0 and γ l = T .
1:
Obtain the optimal solution of PB2.l with
9: end if 10: end while 11: Record the optimal solution of PB2.l with γ l , e.g., ρ * l (γ l ) = {ρ * l t (γ l )} t=1,...,T , and then calculate the corresponding bidding prices, i.e.,
12: end for
Lines 3 -9 show the main loop of Algorithm 1. In Line 3, the optimal solution of PB2.l with γ l , which is the middle value of the current interval, is obtained, i.e., ρ * l = {ρ * l t } t=1,...,T . Then, in Line 4, the value of h l (ρ * l ) is computed by Monte Carlo method. Specifically, consider an experiment of T independent events, whose success probabilities are {ρ * l t } t=1,...,T , respectively. Repeat the experiment N times, and record the number of success events in the nth experiment as k n . Then, h l (ρ * l ) can be approximated as
, where 1(·) is the indicator function. In Line 5, we check whether q l (
) is negative or not. If yes, we update the lower value of the search interval as the middle value in Line 6, i.e.,
. Otherwise, the upper value of the interval is updated in Line 8, i.e., γ l =
When the search for all L subproblems has been completed, we return the bidding policy that contains the bidding prices in all subproblems as the output.
Last, we analyze the performance of the bidding policy computed by Algorithm 1, and provide an upper bound on the gap between the total payment by the proposed bidding policy and the optimal payment. Similar as in the hard chance constraint case, our key idea is to introduce a conservative approximation problem of PB1 and then derive the optimal value gap between this approximation problem and PB3 (a relaxed problem of PB1), which can bound the performance gap between the optimal solution and the solution computed by Algorithm 1. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Let F (ρ * (γ)) and F * denote the payment with ρ * (γ) obtained by Algorithm 1 and the optimal payment of PB1, respectively. Then, the difference between F (ρ * (γ)) and
where λ * l is the optimal solution of the lth dual problem
Proof. The proof mainly contains two steps. First, by setting the required percentage α l as 1 in PB1 and using a similar approximation of PA2 to PA1 in Section 4, we obtain a very conservative approximation problem of PB1 as follows:
Let F * a and F * r are the optimal values of PB4 and PB3, respectively. Notice that both PB3 and PB4 can be solved by independently solving L subproblems (e.g., PB3.l and each bidding policy and the bidding policy corresponding to Lower Bound. From the figure, the time-average gap of total payment of both our proposed policy and uniform policy decreases with the increase of the system requirement 1 − ǫ. This is because when 1 − ǫ increases, corresponding to the case with more stringent system requirement on the sensing robustness, both policies as well as the "Lower Bound" policy will provides large bids to satisfy the sensing robustness requirement. In contrary, there is no awareness of the sensing robustness requirement in the random policy, which results in a lower payment than the "Lower Bound" policy. And we find that the time-average gap of total payment between our proposed policy and the "Lower Bound" policy is not large, especially under stringent sensing robustness requirement. Table 1 shows the results of the joint probability that the sensing robustness requirement at any time and location is satisfied under the four bidding policies, compared with the system requirement. From the table, we can clearly obtain that our policy can always meet the system requirement, while all the other policies are infeasible. Furthermore, to reduce the total payment, the joint probability under our policy is just slightly larger than the system requirement. policy is largest, which corresponds to the largest total payment, since it chooses the bids with the consideration in β only and without considering α l . The results in Fig. 4 is similar as in Fig. 3 , except that the gap of our policy is slightly lower than that of the random policy when β is large.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how to minimize the total payment with the sensing robustness requirement in crowdsensing. We for the first time utilized chance constraints to model the sensing robustness requirement, and considered both the hard chance constraint case and soft chance constraint case. We reformulated the crowdsensing problem with a hard chance constraint into a solvable approximation problem. And we proposed a binary search algorithm based on Monte Carlo method, to obtain a feasible solution of the problem with soft chance constraints. We also theoretically analyzed the performance gap of our proposed policies in both two cases. In the future, we plan to consider more detail requirements in the sensing robustness rather than merely the minimum required participants.
can be verified simply by the definition of ρ * and the feasibility ofρ l * to (34). As to the equivalence, by definition, the objective value of PB2 for solution ρ * is
Based on the above steps, the lemma is thus proved.
